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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IMPROVING ACCESS TO EMERGING LIFESAVING DRUGS:
SOLVING THE DISCLOSURE PROBLEM WITHIN THE PATENT
DANCE
ABSTRACT
Biologics are a growing class of pharmaceutical drugs and are associated
with a significant portion of major medical breakthroughs over the past fifty
years. However, in comparison with traditional small-molecule drugs, biologics
are vastly more complex, more difficult to manufacture, and extremely
expensive. Congress passed the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act
(BPCIA) in an effort to increase the availability of biosimilars—the generic
versions of biologic drugs—but the BPCIA has been largely ineffective. This is
due, in part, to the lack of a standard regarding initial information disclosures
required at the outset of the BPCIA process, leading to a cumbersome and
inefficient process that is mired in disputes over the adequacy of initial
disclosures. Rulings by the Supreme Court in Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. and the
Federal Circuit in Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc. have further complicated the
issue and cemented several problematic practices. This article examines the
impact of the current lack of a disclosure standard within the BPCIA and
proposes that the adoption of the enablement standard from patent law would
reduce unnecessary litigation, provide a more streamlined process, and bring
some much-needed balance to follow-on competition. Such a change is likely to
increase the number of biosimilars entering the market, leading to decreased
patient costs and increased accessibility for millions of patients whose lives may
depend on access to this critical class of drugs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Susie Christoff is a fifty-nine-year-old woman who suffers from debilitating
psoriatic arthritis. 1 After trying a series of treatments, Christoff finally found one
that worked: an expensive, once-a-month injection of Cosentyx, a treatment
manufactured by Novartis. 2 Without the treatment, Christoff’s fingers swell
significantly, and she describes her daily experience as “24/7 constant pain in
. . . the ankles and feet . . . I can’t sleep, I can’t sit still. I cry. I throw pillows.
It’s just . . . awful.” 3 When a disability caused Christoff to switch her insurance
to a Medicare Advantage plan, her out-of-pocket costs for the monthly treatment
soared to $1,300 a month—more than three times her monthly car payment. 4 As
Christoff recounted, “I can’t get down on the sand to play with my kids without
help. I can’t get up without help. . . I’m not ready to stop trying. But I’m also
not ready to go through my entire retirement fund to walk.”5 Tragically,
Christoff’s struggle with climbing drug prices is not unique.
Cosentyx is part of an emerging class of drugs called biologics. 6 As opposed
to traditional small-molecule drugs that are synthesized through relatively
straightforward chemical reactions, biologics are large, complex molecules
derived from living organisms that are often unstable and challenging to
replicate. 7 While these biologics are difficult and costly to develop and
manufacture, they represent a significant portion of the major medical
breakthroughs over the past fifty years. 8 In many ways, biologics represent “the
cutting-edge of biomedical research” in a time when some areas of smallmolecule drug research and competition are seen as stagnant or exhausted. 9
These biologics are also often the only treatments available for serious chronic
diseases and certain cancers. 10 However, due to their complex nature and high
cost of development, biologics are some of the most expensive treatments in
existence. 11

1. Sarah Jane Tribble, Why the U.S. Remains the Most Expensive Market for ‘Biologic’ Drugs
in the World, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 19, 2018, 1:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/12/19/676401634/why-the-u-s-remains-the-most-expensive-market-for-biologicdrugs-in-the-world.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Tribble, supra note 1.
7. Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1, 3, 5 (2018).
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 6.
11. Rithika Kulathila, BPCIA Update: Entropy Is the Price of an Ordered Framework, 33
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1277, 1282 (2018).
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For example, in 2019, another Novartis drug, Zolgensma, became the first
drug approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to have a price
tag over two million dollars per treatment.12 Zolgensma is currently the only
known treatment for spinal muscular atrophy, a rare disorder that destroys the
nerves that control muscles. 13 Babies born with the most severe form of the
disorder generally do not survive past their second birthdays, but the pricey
treatment may save these children’s lives. 14 While the price of Zolgensma is
abnormally high, even for biologics, 15 the reality for millions of Americans is
that the battle for access to life-changing treatments continues to be limited by
astronomical price tags.
The high prices associated with biologic drugs are not only a byproduct of
their complexity but are also due, in part, to various market forces and current
intellectual property and regulatory frameworks. 16 One of the traditional ways
to lower drug prices is through the introduction of generic versions of drugs into
the market. 17 Under the Affordable Care Act, the Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act (BPCIA) established a framework allowing drug
manufacturers to create and gain approval for generic versions of biologics. 18
Congress originally envisioned the BPCIA to be a streamlined patent dispute
pathway that would clear the way for generic versions of biologics to reach the
market. 19 However, the BPCIA has failed to significantly lower costs or increase
access to these lifesaving treatments, as relatively few generic versions of
12. Rob Stein, At $2.1 Million, New Gene Therapy Is the Most Expensive Drug Ever, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (May 24, 2019, 3:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/05/24/725
404168/at-2-125-million-new-gene-therapy-is-the-most-expensive-drug-ever.
13. Id.; AVEXIS, INC., FULL PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: ZOLGENSMA (rev. 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/media/126109/download.
14. Stein, supra note 12.
15. While individual biologic drug prices vary, Humira, an anti-rheumatoid, has been the
world’s best-selling drug for several years and presents a reasonable approximation of an average
biologic with a price of up to $50,000 a year in the United States. Andrew Pollack, Makers of
Humira and Enbrel Using New Drug Patents to Delay Generic Versions, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 15,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/business/makers-of-humira-and-enbrel-using-newdrug-patents-to-delay-generic-versions.html.
16. See Toon van der Gronde et al., Addressing the Challenge of High-Priced Prescription
Drugs in the Era of Precision Medicine, PLOS ONE, Aug. 16, 2017, at 1 (discussing the impact of
various elements on prescription drug prices, including research and development costs, patent and
registration costs, post-registration and reimbursement schemes, and the product lifecycle within
the market).
17. See Ana Santos Rutschman, Regulatory Malfunctions in the Drug Patent Ecosystem, 70
EMORY L.J. 347, 376 (2020).
18. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §§ 7001–
03, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262).
19. See Biologics and Biosimilars: Balancing Incentives for Innovation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Cts. & Competition Pol’y of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 9 (2009)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Anna G. Eshoo, Representative, Cal.).
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biologics have been approved since the BPCIA’s passage in 2010. 20 As of June
2021, only nine biologic drugs have had generic versions approved by the
FDA. 21 As such, the resulting market competition—and its potential to lower
drug prices and increase patient access—is extremely limited. 22 In comparison,
in 2019 alone, the FDA approved or tentatively approved 1,014 traditional
generic small-molecule drug applications. 23
The failure of the BPCIA is due, in part, to the lack of a standard regarding
initial information disclosures for the generic biological product and its
manufacturing process. This has led to the parties involved expending effort in
arguments over what constitutes an adequate disclosure of this information and
has created a cumbersome and wasteful process. The current state of the BPCIA
is severely at odds with Congress’ original intent of providing a streamlined
pathway to encourage and cultivate the creation of more generics within the
market. 24 In order to correct this problem and bring the BPCIA back in line with
its original goal, Section 262(l)(2)(A) should be amended to establish a clear
disclosure standard of information required of both parties at the start of the
BPCIA patent dispute resolution process. In particular, adoption of the
enablement standard already in use in patent law will allow the involved parties
to enter the BPCIA process on more even footing, reduce unnecessary and
expensive litigation, and provide a more streamlined pathway that encourages
the development of generics to lower drug costs and increase patient access to
these emerging lifesaving drugs.
Part II of this article will examine the differences between traditional smallmolecule drugs and biologics and the nature of the generic versions of biologics
or biosimilars. Part III will discuss the current statutory landscape surrounding
biosimilars, with a particular interest in the BPCIA framework and the statutory
language that creates the biosimilar disclosure problem. Part IV will examine
how court interpretation of the BPCIA has cemented the biosimilar disclosure
problem and led to a widening divide between the interests of the involved
parties. Part V will discuss the need for amending the BPCIA to adopt a clear
disclosure standard and will propose that the enablement standard from patent
law be adopted into the BPCIA.

20. Yaniv Heled, Follow-On Biologics Are Set Up to Fail, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 113,
136 (2018).
21. Purple Book Database of Licensed Biological Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://purplebooksearch.fda.gov/advanced-search/ (last updated June 25, 2021) (sorting view by
BLA Type and reference product information shows all approved 351(k) biosimilar products are
associated with only nine reference products).
22. See Heled, supra note 20, at 134.
23. OFF. OF GENERIC DRUGS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2019 ANNUAL REPORT:
ENSURING ACCESS TO SAFE, AFFORDABLE, AND EFFECTIVE GENERIC DRUGS 2 (2020).
24. See Hearing, supra note 19.
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II. BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS
In general, the pharmaceutical industry consists of two broad classes: smallmolecule drugs and biologics. 25 These classes of pharmaceuticals differ in size,
complexity, and difficulty in manufacturing. 26
A.

Small-Molecule Drugs and Generics

Most small-molecule drugs consist of only a handful of atoms and are
synthesized through relatively straightforward chemical reactions. 27 Aspirin, for
example, consists of only twenty-one atoms, 28 and its chemical synthesis is so
straightforward that some universities have students synthesize aspirin in their
first-year general chemistry courses. 29 For these traditional small-molecule
drugs, generic versions of the drug have the exact same active ingredients as the
original drug. 30
B.

Biologics

In contrast, biologics consist of thousands, and in some cases millions, of
atoms in complex, three-dimensional structures. 31 For example, Humira, a
monoclonal antibody protein-based biologic, is the best-selling drug in the
United States and consists of over 25,000 atoms contained in 1,330 amino
acids. 32 Even among biologics, there can be a vast difference in size and
complexity, leading one scholar to note, “if an aspirin were a bicycle, a small
biologic would be a Toyota Prius, and a large biologic would be an F-16 fighter
jet.” 33
In addition to their already complex structure, a host of alterations can be
made to the biologic once the overall structure has been achieved. 34 These
alterations may even occur unintentionally due to minute changes in the

25. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 7, at 5.
26. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2016).
27. Id. at 1033.
28. Id. at 1026.
29. E.g., John Olmsted III, Synthesis of Aspirin: A General Chemistry Experiment, 75 J.
CHEM. EDUC. 1261, 1261 (1998).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii).
31. Robin Feldman, The Cancer Curse: Regulatory Failure by Success, 21 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 82, 101 (2019).
32. This total number of atoms is estimated from the known number of amino acids in Humira
and the average number of atoms per amino acid. ABBVIE INC., FULL PRESCRIBING INFORMATION:
HUMIRA (rev. Feb. 2021), https://www.rxabbvie.com/pdf/humira.pdf; Amino Acids, INT’L
IMMUNOGENETICS INFO. SYS., http://www.imgt.org/IMGTeducation/Aide-memoire/_UK/amino
acids/abbreviation.html (last updated Jan. 20, 2020).
33. Price & Rai, supra note 26.
34. Id. at 1036.
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manufacturing process used to create the biologic. 35 Because biologics are not
directly synthesized through predictable chemical reactions but are grown inside
living organisms, slight changes in the internal environment of the cells are often
unavoidable. 36 Any resulting alterations to the final structure of the biologic may
alter how the resulting product interacts with the body and can impact its
effectiveness. 37 This inherent risk of potential unwanted modifications presents
part of the difficulty in copying known biologics. 38 Further complicating the
issue is the inadequacy of current analytical techniques to accurately
characterize biologics and identify the presence of any modifications. 39 These
complications increase the difficulty, cost, and time required to manufacture
biologics and underscore the need for consistency within the manufacturing
process, as only slight variations in that process can lead to costly variations in
results.
C. Biosimilars
The challenges inherent to biologics are only further intensified when
attempting to copy a biologic to create a generic version. Unlike small-molecule
generics that have the exact same active ingredients as the original drug, minor
differences between the generic copy and the original biologic are unavoidable
due to their complexity and sensitivity to minute changes in the manufacturing
process. 40 As such, follow-on copies of a biologic are not called generics, but
“biosimilars.” 41 However, just like a generic small-molecule drug, the
introduction of a biosimilar into the market can significantly lower prices for the
original biologic and increase treatment accessibility for many patients. 42
To gain FDA approval for a biosimilar, a manufacturer must demonstrate
through a series of tests and human clinical trials that any changes that exist
between the biosimilar and the original biologic are not “clinically meaningful,”
meaning they do not affect its safety, purity, or effectiveness. 43 Because a
follow-on biosimilar maker will not have full access to the manufacturing
process used by the original biologic maker, the manufacturing process is likely

35. Helen Wang, Small vs Big: Understanding the Differences Between Small Molecule Drugs
and Biologic Drugs, IMMPRESS MAG. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.immpressmagazine.com
/small-vs-big-understanding-the-differences-between-small-molecule-drugs-and-biologic-drugs/.
36. See id.
37. Price & Rai, supra note 26, at 1036.
38. See Wang, supra note 35.
39. Price & Rai, supra note 26, at 1036.
40. Linfong Tzeng, Follow-On Biologics, Data Exclusivity, and the FDA, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 135, 138 (2010).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2).
42. See Rutschman, supra note 17.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

IMPROVING ACCESS TO EMERGING LIFESAVING DRUGS

207

to be different, causing slight changes in the end product. 44 Thus, the need for
additional testing and information is required for the FDA to determine that the
biosimilar is sufficiently similar to the original biologic in terms of “safety,
purity, and potency.” 45 This significantly increases both the time and cost of
producing a biosimilar over those of a generic small-molecule drug.
III. THE STATUTORY LANDSCAPE SURROUNDING BIOSIMILARS
A.

The Original Product Patent

The legal foundation of patent protection lies in the very Constitution which
gave to Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 46 A pharmaceutical inventor seeking
patent protection for a novel drug must submit to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office a patent application that meets the statutory requirements laid out by
Congress in Title Thirty-Five of the United States Code. 47 Among these
requirements is the obligation for a patent application to disclose sufficient
information to allow a person having ordinary skill in the relevant field to
reproduce the invention or product without undue experimentation. 48 This
obligation is termed the “enablement requirement” and serves to facilitate the
dissemination of information into the relevant field as well as prevent the
applicant from claiming protection for more than what their invention actually
does. 49 As a patent application is made public eighteen months after its
submission, 50 the enablement requirement is a crucial disclosure that allows
follow-on researchers to improve on the original invention, or in the case of
pharmaceutical drugs, it allows follow-on drug makers to create generic versions
of those drugs. 51 The introduction of these generics into the market plays an
important role in lowering drug costs and increasing access to lifesaving
treatments for many patients. 52

44. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(aa); CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RSCH.,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A
REFERENCE PRODUCT 5–6 (2015), https://www.fda.gov/media/82647/download.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(cc).
46. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 112. For a discussion of “undue experimentation” and its application to
biological technologies, see generally CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 127–30 (Rachel
E. Barkow et al. eds., 5th ed. 2020).
49. NARD, supra note 48, at 95–96.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A).
51. See NARD, supra note 48, at 95.
52. See Rutschman, supra note 17.
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The Hatch-Waxman Act

In 1984, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in an effort to increase
competition for generic small-molecule drugs and foster pharmaceutical
innovation. 53 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drugs with the same active
ingredients, dosage, administration, performance, and safety as patented brandname drugs can avoid the lengthy and expensive new drug process with the
FDA. These generics can instead file an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) during the period of patent protection for the name brand drug without
the required ANDA research and testing being considered patent infringement. 54
In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a patent notice-and-litigation
scheme where brand drugs identify the patents they believe would be infringed
by the marketing of a generic, and the FDA publishes this list to make it available
for all follow-on generic drug makers. 55 A generic drug maker attempting to file
an ANDA application during the patent period of the name brand drug must then
provide specific certifications regarding each of the patents listed by the brand
drug. 56 Overall, the Hatch-Waxman Act has been extremely effective in
increasing the number of generics available to health care providers and patients
in the United States, with generics only making up nineteen percent of
prescriptions in 1984 but eighty-eight percent of prescriptions in 2015. 57 In
addition, generics cost, on average, less than one-fifth the price of their brandname counterparts, simultaneously increasing accessibility and drastically
lowering the cost to patients throughout the health care system. 58
C. The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act
In an attempt to recreate this success for biologics, Congress passed the
BPCIA as part of the Affordable Care Act in 2010 to allow pharmaceutical
companies to develop biosimilars and gain FDA approval before the original
biologic’s patent protection has expired. 59 Although they have similar goals, the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the BPCIA attempt to achieve those goals through very
different approaches. While the Hatch-Waxman Act created a patent notice-and
litigation scheme where brand drugs must identify up-front the patents that
would be implicated by a generic drug maker, 60 the BPCIA only requires the
53. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355); Carrier & Minniti, supra note
7, at 11.
54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)–(c); Carrier & Minniti, supra note 7, at 12.
56. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2).
57. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 7, at 13.
58. Id.
59. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §§ 7001–
03, 124 Stat. 119, § 7002(k), 804, 805 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262).
60. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)–(c).
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brand drug to identify asserted patents once the BPCIA process is underway, 61
meaning that a biosimilar maker will have to invest significant amounts of time
and effort before they may know exactly what patents are going to be asserted
against them.
Within its process, the BPCIA creates an abbreviated pathway for the
approval and licensure of two different types of follow-on biologics: biosimilars
and interchangeable biologics. 62 Biosimilars must show that they are “highly
similar” to the original biologic 63 and that there are “no clinically meaningful
differences” between the follow-on biosimilar and the original biologic. 64
Biosimilar applicants must also submit to the FDA specific information
regarding any facilities where the biosimilar is produced and the manufacturing
processes used. 65 If the above requirements are met, biosimilar applicants may
rely on pre-existing, publicly available data establishing the safety, purity, and
potency of the original biologic for their biosimilar product, saving them from
even more lengthy and expensive additional testing. 66
Interchangeable biologics must meet all of the above requirements for
biosimilars and additionally show that the interchangeable product can be used
as a substitute for the original biologic without the intervention of the health care
provider who prescribed the original biologic, meaning that the interchangeable
product can be expected to produce the same clinical result as the original
biologic in any given patient. 67 As this additional showing is accompanied with
increased testing and costs, applicants are incentivized and rewarded for
achieving interchangeable status by receiving one year of exclusivity for being
the first interchangeable version of a biologic before any competing products
can receive similar approval. 68 However, as of July 2021, no follow-on biologic
has ever been approved as interchangeable. 69
D. The BPCIA Patent Dance
Unlike the patent notice requirement under the Hatch-Watchman Act, the
BPCIA does not require the FDA to maintain a public listing of patents claiming
a biologic’s subject matter. Instead, the BPCIA provides a complex series of
steps to be followed by the applicant seeking approval of a biosimilar (the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 262(k).
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(B).
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(V).
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(iii).
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3); Biosimilar and Interchangeable Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-and-interchangeable-products
#biosimilar (last updated Oct. 23, 2017).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6).
69. Purple Book Database of Licensed Biological Products, supra note 21.
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applicant) and the original biologic patent holder (the sponsor) to identify,
resolve, and/or litigate the involved patent issues. 70 This complex series of steps
has colloquially become known as the “patent dance.” 71 While the legislative
history surrounding the BPCIA indicates the patent dance was originally
envisioned to “ensure that litigation surrounding relevant patents [would] be
resolved expeditiously and prior to the launch of the biosimilar product,
[thereby] providing certainty to the applicant, the [original biologic sponsor],
and the public at large,” 72 the patent dance of today fails to meet these lofty
goals.
The BPCIA’s patent dance can be broken down into two phases. Phase One
begins with the parties identifying which patents will be litigated and culminates
with an initial round of litigation. 73 Phase Two consists of a second round of
litigation wherein the biologic sponsor may assert patent claims against the
biosimilar applicant for any patents identified at the beginning of Phase One but
not included in the first round of litigation. 74 Thus, the initial identification of
patents that will be included throughout the patent dance plays a critical role
from the very outset of the BPCIA framework.
Phase One of the patent dance is triggered once the FDA accepts a biosimilar
application. 75 The applicant then has twenty days to provide to the original
biologic sponsor a copy of the FDA application and “such other information that
describes the process or processes used to manufacture the biological product
that is the subject of such application.” 76 Using this initial disclosure, the sponsor
has sixty days to provide to the applicant a list of patents the sponsor believes
“could reasonably be asserted” against the applicant. 77 The applicant is then
given sixty days to respond to the sponsor and provide a list of patents that the
applicant concedes could be asserted against it, as well as a detailed statement
declaring invalidity, noninfringement, or unenforceability for any patents the
applicant claims cannot be asserted against it. 78 The sponsor then responds with
its own detailed statement regarding the applicant’s assertions for invalidity,
noninfringement, and unenforceability of the relevant patents. 79
Following this exchange of assertions, the patent dance requires “good faith
negotiations” to occur between the parties to determine the patents to be

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

42 U.S.C. § 262(l).
Carrier & Minniti, supra note 7, at 17.
Hearing, supra note 19.
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)–(6).
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(7)–(8).
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(A)(i).
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(B).
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(C).
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litigated. 80 If the parties cannot reach an agreement on the patents for litigation,
a final exchange of lists occurs. 81 The applicant provides to the sponsor the
number of patents that will be included on the final Phase One list, and on a
designated date, both parties simultaneously exchange a final list of patents for
litigation. 82 The sponsor cannot list more patents than the total number identified
by the applicant but may include different patents than those listed by the
applicant. 83 Once these final lists have been exchanged, the sponsor has thirty
days to initiate patent infringement litigation regarding the patents included on
either of the party’s final lists. 84
Phase Two of the patent dance occurs once the biosimilar applicant provides
notice of commercial marketing to the biologic sponsor. This must occur no later
than 180 days before the date of the first commercial marketing of the biosimilar
product, even if this is years after the patent dance initially began. 85 In Phase
Two, the sponsor may bring further patent infringement suits, but only for those
patents that were included in the initial list at the very beginning of the patent
dance. 86 Thus, the entirety of the patent dance framework depends on correctly
identifying which patents are at issue from the very beginning of the process.
IV. FURTHERING THE DISCLOSURE DIVIDE: SANDOZ AND AMGEN
While the framework set out by the BPCIA is complex and burdensome
under the best circumstances, ambiguities in the statute’s language have added
significant challenges to the statute’s effectiveness. Under Section 262(l)(2)(A),
the BPCIA requires a biosimilar applicant to provide to the original biologic
sponsor at the outset of the patent dance a copy of the biosimilar FDA
application and “such other information that describes the process or processes
used to manufacture the biological product that is the subject of such
application.” 87 However, the statute does not define what “such other
information that describes the process” includes or what constitutes an adequate
disclosure of such information. 88

80. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4)(A).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4)(B).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(5).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(5)(B)(ii). However, an exception to this rule applies if the applicant
does not list any patents, in which case the sponsor may list one patent. 42 U.S.C. §
262(l)(5)(B)(ii)(II).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(6).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(B). An exception to this rule is provided for cases of newly issued
or licensed patents obtained by the biologic sponsor while the patent dance was proceeding. 42
U.S.C. § 262(l)(7).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A).
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A).
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This often leads to disagreement between the biosimilar applicant and the
original biologic sponsor over whether any particular disclosure meets the
requirements of the BPCIA. 89 On one side of the disclosure argument, the
biosimilar applicant will want to disclose as little information as possible
because many of the processes used in the manufacturing process are not
protected by patent but as trade secrets. 90 A trade secret may be any information,
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique,
or process that “derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable” by others,
and for which the secret holder makes “efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” 91 Thus, the “economic value” of the
applicant’s manufacturing process is only protected so long as he maintains
reasonable efforts to keep it a secret. This creates a significant incentive for the
biosimilar applicant to withhold as much information as possible, despite the
confidential nature of BPCIA disclosures, 92 and to only disclose what is
statutorily required of the applicant.
On the other side of the disclosure argument is the original biological
sponsor. The sponsor will contend that minimal or nonexistent disclosures under
Section 262(l)(2)(A) are insufficient because the biologic sponsor needs this
information to be able to create the initial list of patents that may be infringed
by the biosimilar applicant’s manufacturing process and product. 93 If the
sponsor is not provided with any information or with largely insufficient
information, the sponsor will be unable to adequately gauge which of their
patents may be implicated for dispute, and the entire framework of the BPCIA
is therefore undermined right from the first step. 94 As courts have interpreted the
BPCIA, they have failed to address this issue directly, and several court rulings
have furthered the divide between applicant and sponsor interests. 95
A.

Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. further
complicated the issue when they held that participation in the patent resolution
process outlined in the BPCIA is made voluntary through the framework of the
BPCIA itself. In Sandoz, a biosimilar applicant notified the original biologic
sponsor that the applicant had submitted an FDA application but that it would
not provide the sponsor with a copy of the application or any information about
89. See, e.g., Complaint for Patent Infringement and Declaratory Judgment at 52–53,
Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. 1:17-cv-01471-GMS (D. Del. Oct. 18, 2017).
90. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 7, at 24.
91. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1985).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(1).
93. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 89, at 4–5.
94. See id. at 11.
95. See infra Sections IV.A. and IV.B.
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the applicant’s manufacturing process. 96 The sponsor sued for patent
infringement and sought injunctions to enforce both disclosure requirements of
Section 262(l)(2)(A). The applicant counterclaimed for declaratory judgments
that the asserted patent was invalid and that the applicant had not violated the
BPCIA by withholding the disclosures. 97
In analyzing the issue, the Supreme Court found that within the BPCIA, the
remedies available for a party’s non-compliance are limited by Section
262(l)(9)(C), which shifts control of the patent dance away from the applicant
and allows the sponsor to initiate patent litigation without being constrained by
the BPCIA’s rules and timings. 98 In essence, this terminates the patent dance
and allows the sponsor to initiate a normal patent litigation. Thus, for a noncompliant applicant, the worst repercussion they may face is simply a normal
patent suit.
While there are definite advantages for the biosimilar applicant to keep the
patent dispute within the confines of the BPCIA as it grants the applicant
significant control over the pacing and scope of the litigation throughout the
patent dance, the loss of those advantages is not catastrophic to the applicant’s
cause. If the applicant decides that these benefits are outweighed by the potential
loss of trade secret protection through the BPCIA disclosures, the applicant is
free to push the envelope on adequate disclosures and know that the worst-case
scenario they face is simply a run-of-the-mill patent litigation. This may account
for why arguments over adequate disclosures under Section 262(l)(2)(A)
continue to appear within BPCIA patent litigation. 99 Future applicants may
continue to become ever more emboldened to test the limit of disclosure
adequacy.
B.

Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc.

Further compounding the issue is the case of Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc. In
that case, the biosimilar applicant only provided to the biologic sponsor a copy
of the FDA application, claiming that the application contained sufficient
information regarding the applicant’s manufacturing process as to meet the
disclosure requirement of Section 262(l)(2)(A). 100 The sponsor responded in a
letter to the applicant asserting that the applicant had failed to “fully disclose the
specific composition of the cell-culture medium used in the manufacture” of the
biosimilar. 101 The applicant replied that the components used were

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1673 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 1675.
See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 89.
Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 866 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id.
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“commercially-available raw materials” and that sufficient information had been
provided. 102
The two parties continued into the patent dance outlined in the BPCIA, but
the biologic sponsor was faced with a dilemma. 103 Could the sponsor reasonably
assert patents they held for certain processes for culturing cells when they had
received no actual information regarding what processes the applicant was
using? 104 The sponsor decided that without any information at all, they could not
reasonably assert those patents, and the patents pertaining to the cell-culture
medium were left off of the initial patent lists exchanged with the applicant.105
Subsequently, as the parties moved into the first stage of litigation under the
patent dance, the sponsor attempted to force disclosure of the applicant’s cellculture medium composition during discovery. 106 The district court denied the
sponsor’s motion to compel discovery, stating that the cell-culture information
held no relevance to the patents that had been asserted and were at issue in the
current litigation. 107 On appeal, the court found that due to Sandoz’s holding
regarding the limited remedies available for disclosure non-compliance, the only
way the sponsor could compel disclosure of the information was if the patent
pertaining to the cell-culture medium had been included on the initial patent list
or was being directly asserted in the litigation. 108
The court stated that in addition to asserting patents actually shown to be
infringed by an applicant’s disclosure, the biologic sponsor is required by statute
to include all “patents that it ‘believes . . . could reasonably be asserted’” if
additional information were provided. 109 Thus, actual evidence of infringement
is not needed, merely the possibility that infringement could theoretically occur.
Therefore, a complete lack of evidence or information indicating infringement
does not preclude inclusion of the patent on the initial list. 110
Further, the court noted that for every patent asserted on the initial list, even
those asserted without any evidence of infringement, the applicant is obligated
to respond with detailed statements concerning whether the patent is invalid,
unenforceable, or will not be infringed, and must include the factual and legal
basis upon which that determination is made. 111 The court reasoned that the

102. Id.
103. See id. at 1358.
104. See id.
105. Amgen, 866 F.3d at 1358.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1360–61.
109. Id. at 1362.
110. See Amgen, 866 F.3d at 1362 (detailing the low bar for the inclusion of patents on the
initial list and explaining that a sponsor can assert a patent even if the applicant provided no
information regarding its processes).
111. Id.
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additional disclosures required by these mandatory responses would allow a
sponsor to gauge whether the listed patents could “reasonably be asserted” in
truth before litigation was filed, and thus the “reasonableness” requirement of
the statute would be met. 112 However, because the patents concerning the cellculture medium were not asserted in the initial list of patents, the applicant had
no such obligation to provide further disclosures, and the sponsor could not
compel the disclosure after the fact. 113
V. CORRECTING THE FALLOUT FROM SANDOZ AND AMGEN
A.

The Disclosure Problem

The holdings in Sandoz and Amgen have entrenched the problematic
practices on both sides of the disclosure issue. Through Sandoz, participation in
the patent dance is voluntary, with biosimilar applicants who push the legal
envelope on disclosure not risking the validity of their products or claims but
merely risking the advantages they gain from the BPCIA framework in
controlling the scope and pace of the patent litigation. While this undoubtedly
has value, that value must be weighed against the potential losses the applicant
may face through possible disclosure of trade secrets regarding manufacturing
processes. Thus, Sandoz works to push biosimilar applicants to withhold as
much information as possible as they enter the initial steps of the patent dance.
On the opposite end, Amgen pushes the idea that if biologic sponsors wish
to preserve their ability to assert their patent rights, they must be overzealous in
asserting on the initial patent list any patent that may be even remotely related
in the most tenuous manner to the biosimilar product, whether there is actual
evidence of infringement or not. While the BPCIA still requires any such patent
assertions to be reasonable, 114 the court’s interpretation of reasonable in Amgen
appears to make this limit almost nonexistent.
The impact these two practices have on the framework of the BPCIA’s
patent dance is potentially catastrophic. Rather than provide the intended
streamlined process to expeditiously resolve biosimilar patent issues, 115 the
process has become an overly complex system mired down in superfluous
arguments and litigation over unrelated patents, resulting in decreased followon biosimilar competition and innovation that fails to competitively lower drug
prices or increase accessibility for patients. 116 Both of these practices—that of
applicants pushing the limit on minimally disclosing information regarding the
manufacturing process and sponsors using a “kitchen sink” approach to include
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 1361–62.
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A)(i).
Hearing, supra note 19.
See Heled, supra note 20, at 115–19.
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every patent possible in the initial listing—need to be curtailed in order to move
the BPCIA back toward its original goal.
B.

Adopting the Enablement Standard for Disclosures Within the BPCIA

To achieve this goal, Section 262(l)(2)(A) needs to be amended to provide
clear guidance to both the biosimilar applicant and the biologic sponsor on the
degree of information required in the initial disclosure. To that end, I propose
the BPCIA should adopt the previously discussed enablement standard already
in use for patent applications—that is, the applicant would be required to
disclose sufficient information regarding the manufacturing process to enable a
person having ordinary skill in the field of biologic drug development to make
and use the biologic product without undue experimentation. 117 Under this
proposal, the patent dance becomes more equitable, and the parties lose much of
the incentive for unnecessary posturing and excessive litigation at the outset of
the process, therefore bringing some much needed balance to follow-on
competition. This, in turn, will increase the prospect of access to, and
affordability of, critical biologic therapies for patients in need.
This proposal also offers four further advantages: (1) it allows sponsors to
accurately assess which patents are at issue; (2) it provides courts with a readymade standard for implementation; (3) it equalizes the relationship between the
parties engaging in the patent dance; and (4) it allows applicants to gauge any
potential risk to trade secrets posed by the BPCIA disclosures. First, such a
disclosure would enable the sponsor to assess more accurately which of their
patents may in fact be infringed by the applicant’s manufacturing and
development processes. As the very purpose of the patent dance is ostensibly to
provide an efficient pathway for the relevant parties to resolve this very
question, 118 the importance of this point cannot be overstated. An increase in
clarity at the outset of the process regarding which patents are actually at issue
will result in significant reductions in time and cost for both sides, and
significant reductions of judicial cost, as the most tenuous and superfluous patent
assertions are ruled out of the patent dance right from the beginning. With such
a disclosure standard in place, the broad reading of what a sponsor may
“reasonably” assert, adopted by the court in Amgen, 119 would be unnecessary.
The disclosure itself would narrow the reasonableness of “kitchen sink”
assertions and lead to a more efficient process for all involved.
Second, the proposal provides courts with a ready-made standard. Issues of
adequate disclosure are not new to patent law, and by adopting the enablement
117. See supra Section III.A.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (establishing the framework of the patent dance wherein every step
is centered around resolving the fundamental question of potential patent infringement by the
biosimilar product).
119. Amgen Inc., 866 F.3d 1361–62.
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standard here, Congress could allow courts to consider the vast backdrop of
common law precedent in interpreting the enablement standard. Thus, courts
would have a ready-made standard with which they are already familiar and that
they could implement immediately.
Third, the proposal equalizes the relationship between the parties engaging
in the patent dance. The enablement standard is at the heart of the disclosure
requirement for the biologic sponsor to obtain the patent in the first place. This
disclosure, as contained in the biologic sponsor’s patent application, is not
confidential but it is published by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office eighteen
months after the patent application is filed, 120 making it available to the
biosimilar applicant. By adopting the enablement standard within the BPCIA,
the biosimilar applicant will merely be required to disclose to the sponsor the
same degree of information that the applicant already has access to regarding the
sponsor’s processes. Any such disclosure would retain the same high level of
confidentiality that currently exists within the BPCIA, 121 but it would allow the
two parties to enter the patent dance on more equal footing.
Finally, with a clear disclosure standard in place, biosimilar applicants
would be able to gauge more accurately any potential risk to their trade secrets
that the BPCIA disclosure would present. The standard would provide applicants
a clear guideline regarding what information could be withheld and what
information must be disclosed. Under Sandoz, applicants who decide that the
advantages gained from the BPCIA framework are outweighed by any potential
risk to their trade secrets may still opt-out of the patent dance and avoid the
disclosure entirely, unless the disclosure is later obligated during a normal patent
suit.
C. Opposition to the Adoption of a Disclosure Standard
Despite these benefits, biosimilar applicants are almost sure to oppose the
adoption of such a standard. Many will likely argue that adopting the enablement
standard within the BPCIA is unjustified and requires a degree of disclosure that
is too high. For a patent applicant, the tradeoff and reward for this level of
disclosure is the protection gained from the patent, 122 making the disclosure
worthwhile. However, for a biosimilar applicant, there is no such protection;
they simply get to sell the biosimilar product. 123 The disclosure requirement may
then disincentivize drug makers from producing biosimilars, further
exacerbating the current need for these critical drugs. However, through the
BPCIA framework, biosimilar applicants may develop and gain approval for the
120. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(1).
122. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112.
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (granting limited exclusivity rights for the first approved
interchangeable biologic product, but no such rights for biosimilar products).
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biosimilar during the original biologic’s period of patent protection. 124 Thus,
while the applicants are not granted the rights of exclusivity that come with a
patent, they are allowed to infringe the patent rights of another in order to
develop a competing drug. If we are to allow biosimilar makers to freely infringe
on the patent protection of another for their own personal gain by developing a
competing biosimilar, while having access to the biologic sponsor’s disclosure
of the sponsor’s manufacturing process through their patent application, then it
is not unreasonable that the biosimilar applicant be required to disclose the same
degree of information to ensure that other patents the sponsor holds are not also
being infringed without approval.
Opponents of the proposal are also likely to argue that adopting the
enablement standard would constitute a substantial increase in the disclosure
requirement that unjustly shifts the balance of the BPCIA toward the interests of
the biologic sponsor. This may be true to a degree, insofar as adopting any
standard would be an increase over the current state of no standard within the
BPCIA, and any increase in burden on one party would inevitably shift the
balance of interest. However, the current balance, with no disclosure standard
whatsoever, likely was not Congress’ original intention. The current state of the
BPCIA, with no disclosure standard, a “kitchen sink” approach to the initial
asserted patents suggested by Amgen, and the optional nature of participation
confirmed in Sandoz, has created a cumbersome, inefficient process at direct
odds with the original intent of Congress for the BPCIA. Adoption of the
enablement standard, while shifting the balance of interest between the parties,
would create a more efficient patent dispute resolution pathway that, on balance,
would better further Congress’ original intention of fostering more follow-on
competition and improving access to lifesaving biologic therapies.
VI. CONCLUSION
The patent dance framework is a lengthy and complex process at the best of
times. Unfortunately, due to ambiguities in the language of the statute that have
led to counterproductive practices from biosimilar applicants and biologic
sponsors at the very outset of the patent dance, the BPCIA has become overly
burdensome and excessive. This, in turn, has led to the BPCIA being relatively
ineffective in increasing the number of lifesaving biosimilars available to
patients in the marketplace or in significantly lowering the extreme cost of these
drugs. 125
124. Although the term of patent protection is twenty years, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2), a follow-on
biologic developer may submit an application to the FDA for a biosimilar product only four years
after the original patented biologic product was first approved, 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B), and can
receive approval for the biosimilar product twelve years after the original biologic product was first
approved, 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A).
125. Heled, supra note 20.
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In order to start correcting the issues that currently exist within the BPCIA
and to bring the statute back in line with its original intent, the statutory language
in Section 262(l)(2)(A), describing the initial disclosures required of the
biosimilar applicant at the start of the patent dance, must be amended to establish
a clear standard of what constitutes an adequate disclosure. Adoption of the
enablement standard from patent law into the BPCIA would provide clear
guidance on the amount of information required in the initial applicant
disclosures and allow both parties to enter the patent dance on more even
footing, reduce unnecessary and expensive litigation, and streamline the entirety
of the patent dance. As this process becomes more efficient, both in terms of
time and money, it is likely that we will see a rise in the number of biosimilars
submitted and approved within the U.S. market. Such a rise would mean
decreased costs and increased accessibility for millions of patients—like Susie
Christoff—whose lives may depend on access to this critical class of lifesaving
drugs.
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